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ABSTRACT This paper investigates the physical layer security in heterogeneous networks (HetNets)
supported by simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT). We first consider a
two-tier HetNet composed of a macrocell and several femtocells, where the macrocell base station (BS)
serves multiple users in the presence of a malicious eavesdropper, while each femtocell BS serves a
couple of Internet-of-Things (IoT) users. With regard to the energy constraint of IoT users, SWIPT is
performed at the femtocell BSs, and IoT users accomplish the reception of information and energy in a
time-switching manner, where information secrecy is to be protected. To enhance the secrecy performance,
we inject artificial noise (AN) into the transmit beam at both macrocell and femtocell BSs, and for
the sake of achieving green communications, we formulate the problem of maximizing secrecy energy
efficiency while considering the fairness in a cross-tier multi-cell coordinated beamforming (MCBF) design.
To handle this resulting nonconvex max–min fractional program problem, we propose an iterative algorithm
by applying successive convex approximation method. Then, we further develop a decentralized solution
based on alternative direction multiplier method (ADMM), which reduces the overhead of information
exchange among coordinated BSs and achieves good approximation performance. Finally, simulation results
demonstrate the performance of the proposed AN-aided cross-tier MCBF design and verify the validity of
distributed ADMM-based approach.
INDEX TERMS Physical layer security, heterogeneous networks, secrecy energy efficiency, successive
convex approximation, alternative direction multiplier method.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
With the tremendous growth of Internet-enabled smart
devices, the next generation wireless communications
have an ever-increasing demand for exceedingly high
data rate, almost-ubiquitous coverage and reliable secrecy
performance. In this regard, heterogeneous network
(HetNet) [1], [2] has been emerged as a promising approach
by increasing the cell density for higher spatial spec-
trum reuse. Unfortunately, the dense deployment of small
cells (e.g., picocells, femtocells) also incurs great inter-
ferences that may deteriorate the quality of service (QoS)
of users in macrocells, which is deemed as the main
challenge in HetNets. Consequently, the transmit signals
should be carefully designed to eliminate the mutual
interferences.
Meanwhile, the energy consumption is bound to grow with
the increase of data traffics, which may become unafford-
able for low-power devices (e.g., nodes in wireless sensor
networks or Internet of things (IoT)). Thus, more frequent
recharging or replacement of the batteries is required to fur-
ther prolong the lifetime of network, which accompanies the
rising cost in maintenance. Recently, simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer (SWIPT) [3], [4], acting as a
novel research frontier of combining wireless power transfer
and wireless communication, has been envisioned as a sta-
ble and continuous energy supply for the energy-constrained
wireless systems. In SWIPT, devices can harvest energy from
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radio-frequency (RF) signals ignoring the content carried,
and this peculiarity contributes to the case of applying SWIPT
into HetNets owning to the fact that all inter-tier and intra-
tier interferences could contribute to the power supply for the
harvesting devices.
The sharing of spectrum resources in addition to simulta-
neous transmission of power and information is achieved in
virtue of the open nature of wireless propagation channels,
which may however yield information leakage to the HetNets
and SWIPT systems. To address this concern, innovative
security technologies have been proposed. As an important
complement to the traditional high-layer cryptographic meth-
ods, physical layer security (PLS) [5], [6] exploits the ‘‘fin-
gerprint’’ of wireless channels to protect communications
from being eavesdropped with low computational complex-
ity, providing a novel approach to solving the issue of infor-
mation leakage in HetNets and SWIPT systems, especially
those including IoT devices that are poorly configured in
hardwares. Thus, we focus on designing an efficient PLS
scheme for SWIPT-enabled HetNets in this paper.
B. RELATED WORKS
Over the past few years, great achievements have been
devoted to the issue of PLS in HetNets [7]–[11]. With the aid
of stochastic geometry, Zhong et al. [7] proposed a tractable
approach to analyze PLS in a K-tier HetNet, in which the
secrecy coverage probability and the achievable secrecy rate
for an arbitrary user were derived. Afterwards,Wang et al. [8]
developed a user association policy based on an access
threshold for PLS enhancement in the downlink of multi-
tier HetNets. While Qi et al. [9] described a cognitive
HetNet model under threshold-based protocols and derived
the secrecy outage probability of cognitive users in the pres-
ence of non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers, respec-
tively. Moreover, the PLS performance in the downlink Het-
Nets was promoted by using friendly jammers and full-duplex
users in [10]. Previous research works studied the PLS in
HetNets by focusing on the secrecy model and performance
evaluations, but as mentioned before, the delicate design of
transmit signals is also of great significance to the QoS of
users in HetNets, which was rarely considered except in [11],
where a joint resource allocation algorithm was proposed by
simultaneously considering the PLS, cross-tier interferences
in addition to the fairness requirement.
For securing SWIPT systems with PLS, there have
also been remarkable accomplishments. To name a few,
Liu et al. [12] considered the case where the BS
aimed to transmit confidential information to an infor-
mation receiver (IR) in the presence of multiple energy
receivers (ERs).1 They regarded the ERs as independent
potential eavesdroppers and designed the transmit beam
to maximize the secrecy rate of the IR subject to the
1IR and ER are both legitimated users in the network, where the IR has
permission for information receiving and decoding, while the ER is only
allowed to harvest energy from the ambient power of RF signals.
energy constraint of ERs. On this basis, the robust beam
design was carried out when the channel state informa-
tion (CSI) was imperfectly known at the transmitter in [13].
While Chu et al. [14] dealt with the case where multiple ERs
colludedwith each other to overhear an IR jointly. In addition,
Zhang et al. [15] expanded the number of available antennas
at ERs, and the work in [16] considered a more complicated
scenario, in which the IR and ERs were all equipped with
multiple antennas. In addition, artificial noise (AN) was
introduced to further safeguard SWIPT systems, and the joint
design of AN vector and transmit beam was investigated
detailedly in [17]–[19]. The above-mentioned works studied
the PLS transmission in different scenarios, but were all
limited to the single-cell coverage case, which ignored the
deployment of SWIPT in multi-cell networks.
Recently, applying SWIPT to HetNets has attracted
increasing interests by converting various interferences into
power gain, and PLS was also introduced to the fusion
case (i.e., SWIPT-enabled HetNets) in [20]–[22]. Specifi-
cally, Akbar et al. [20] established a tractable model for
the joint uplink (UL) and downlink (DL) transmission in a
K-tier HetNet with SWIPT, they derived the exact analytical
expressions for the average received power and the outage
probability in both DL and UL transmissions. Li et al. [21]
considered a two-tier HetNet with SWIPT performed in the
femtocells, and they accomplished the beam design to max-
imize the secrecy rate at IR in a femtocell, while satisfying
the QoS requirements at each ER and macrocell user (MU).
Similarly, the transmit beams andAN vectors at themacrocell
BS and femtocell BSs were jointly optimized to maximize
the secrecy rate of the eavesdropped MU under the QoS
constraints of IRs and ERs in [22]. Nonetheless, [21] and [22]
both only considered the security of one type of decoding
users (i.e., either MU or IR), which ignored the worst case
where both IRs and MUs are wiretapped simultaneously by
malicious eavesdroppers (ERs included). Last but not least,
the joint design was executed at a calculating center in the
above works, and thus the exchange of CSI among BSs was
inevitable. However, this will incur signaling overhead to the
network and inestimable processing stress to the calculating
center (especially when the number of coordinated BSs is
large), which should be carefully handled.
C. OUR APPROACH AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we consider a two-tier SWIPT-enabled HetNet,
and focus on the transmit optimization while considering
the aim of green communications as well as the security of
various decoding users. Specifically, our main contributions
can be summarized as follows:
• We establish the model of a two-tier HetNet, where
SWIPT is performed at the femtocell BSs to power IoT
users. We consider a more general case where both the
IoT users and MUs are faced with the threat of secrecy
leakage. To be specific, two kinds of malicious users are
included, the MUs are wiretapped by a passive eaves-
dropper in the macrocell, and the harvesting IoT users
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act as curious users that are interested in the informa-
tion intended for decoding IoT users within the same
femtocell.
• For the sake of security enhancement and power transfer,
we deliberately inject the AN into the transmit beam
at both the macrocell and femtocell BSs. To achieve
green communications and promote the average secrecy
performance, we formulate the joint design problem for
secrecy energy efficiency maximization while consider-
ing the fairness among multiple cells.
• To solve the nonconvex max-min fractional program,
we first apply the semi-definite relaxation (SDR) tech-
nique by holding the tightness of relaxations, and then
propose an iterative algorithm based on successive con-
vex approximation (SCA)with the complexity analyzed.
• To reduce the overhead of CSI exchange in the central-
izedmulti-cell coordinated beamforming design (MCBF)
and release the processing stress on the calculating cen-
ter, we further introduce a decentralized solution based
on the alternative direction multiplier method (ADMM),
which can draw near the optimal solution while allowing
each BS to handle its local CSI only.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
outlines the system model and formulates the optimization
problem. Section III solves the nonconvex problem with
SDR technique and proposes an SCA-based iterative algo-
rithm. Section IV introduces a decentralized solution based
on ADMM. Section V provides the simulation results and
finally Section VI concludes this paper.
Notations: The expectation of a variable is denoted byE(·).
The magnitude of a complex number is denoted by | · |. ‖·‖2
represents the `2 norm.Cp×q represents the space of complex
matrices of dimension p × q. The superscript (·)T and (·)H
denote the transpose and (Hermitian) conjugate transpose,
respectively. Tr(A) and rank(A) represent the trace and the
rank of matrix A, respectively. {am(am)}m∈M denotes the
vector composited by all the am(am) where m ∈M.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. NETWORK STRUCTURE
We consider a two-tier HetNet with SWIPT, as illustrated
in Fig. 1.2 The network is composed of amacrocell BS (MBS)
and N femtocell BSs (FBSs), which share the same spectrum
resources to improve the spectral efficiency. The MBS is
equipped with Km antennas to serve M (Km > M ) MUs, and
there exists an eavesdropper (Eve)3 attempting to intercept
2In Fig. 1, the links between the macrocell and femtocelln illustrate the
inter-tier interferences, while the links between femtocell1 and femtocell2
demonstrate the intra-tier inferences. In other words, there indeed exist
interference links between any two femtocells, but all are omitted except for
those between femtocell1 and femtocell2 for the sake of clarity. Similarly,
the interference links between the macrocell and femtocell1 (femtocell2) are
represented by the links between the macrocell and femtocelln.
3Note that we only consider one Eve in this paper for simplicity of
presentation and calculation. In fact, our work can be extended to the scenario
with multiple Eves in which the considered Eve is the one that achieves the
maximal wiretapping capacity. The more general case with the existence of
multiple Eves will be studied in our future work.
FIGURE 1. Illustration of a two-tier SWIPT-enabled HetNet.
FIGURE 2. Parallel reception of information and power in the TS manner.
the information intended for multiple MUs; while each FBS
is equipped with Kf (Kf > 2) antennas to serve a pair
of femtocell users (FUs). All the users are equipped with
a single antenna. We assume that the FUs are the devices
deployed in IoT, which are severely constrained in energy,
hence SWIPT is performed at the FBSs, and IoT users accom-
plish the reception of information and energy in a time-
switching (TS) manner [23], which can be shown in Fig. 2.
The DL transmission in each femtocell can be separated into
two slots, which is a simple but representable case. In each
slot, the FBS transmits confidential information to a certain
FU (i.e., IR) and transfers energy to the other (i.e., ER), while
the interconversion of roles takes place in the following slot.
In this regard, there is one IR and ER in an arbitrary slot,
which we extract for detailed studies.
We highlight that the ERs are deemed as legitimated users
in the network but can only harvest energy from the ambient
RF signals to accomplish the battery recharging. Unfortu-
nately, the FBSs cannot strictly control the behaviors of IoT
users, which indicates the ERs may turn curious to decode the
private information intended for IRs [13], [17]. In this paper,
we adopt this assumption and further suppose that each ER
only attempts to overhear the IR in the same femtocell.4
For the sake of notational simplicity, we denote the m-th
MU in the macrocell and the IR/ER in the n-th femtocell by
MUm (m ≤ M ) and IRn/ERn (n ≤ N ), respectively.
4When the femtocells belong to different parties, and there is no interest
conflict among them but a competitive relationship between two IoT users
in the same femtocell, it is a reasonable case where they are only interested
in their competitors.
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B. SIGNAL MODEL
Considering the existence of a malicious Eve in the macro-
cell, we adopt the AN to enhance the security of transmission.





where wm ∈ CKm×1 is the beamforming vector aiming at
MUm; sm(t) with E
{|sm|2} = 0 represents the data symbol
intended for MUm; z0 ∈ CKm×1 denotes the AN vector
which follows Gaussian distribution, i.e., z0 ∼ CN (0,6)
and 6  0.
Similarly, the transmit signal at FBSn, can be given by
xn(t) = vncn(t)+ un(t), (2)
where cn(t) with E
{|cn|2} = 0 represents the data symbol
intended for IRn and vn ∈ CKf×1 denotes the corresponding
beamforming vector, while un ∈ CKf×1 is the energy vector
utilized for transferring power to ERn as well as confusing it
in cn(t).
Then, the received signal at MUm, Eve, IRn and ERn can
be respectively expressed as
















































































where hm ∈ CKm×1, he ∈ CKm×1, h0n ∈ CKm×1 and g0n ∈
CKm×1 denote the channels fromMBS to MUm, Eve, IRn and
ERn, respectively; likewise, hjom ∈ CKf×1, hjoe ∈ CKf×1,
hjn ∈ CKf×1 and gjn ∈ CKf×1 denote the channels from
FBSj to MUm, Eve, IRn and ERn, respectively; nm (t), ne (t),
nnir (t) and nner (t) denote the additive Gaussian white noise






ner at MUm, Eve,
IRn and ERn, respectively.
Following (3), (4), (5) and (6), the received signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at MUm, Eve, IRn and
ERn can be respectively given by (7), (8), (9) and (10), which
are presented at the top of next page.
C. HARVESTING MODEL
Now we focus on the wireless power transfer in femto-
cells and discuss the energy harvesting (EH) process of
ERs. In most of the existing research works, EH process is
modeled by the traditional linear model (LM), with which the
functional relation between output direct current (DC) power
Pout and input RF power Pin can be expressed as Pout =
ηPin, where η denotes a constant conversion efficiency (CE).
However, in practice, various non-linearities indicate that
the CE dynamically varies with the input power, thus the
simplified linear approximation of conversion-circuit can not
accurately characterize the EH performance. To better reflect
the dynamism of CE, we adopt a more practical non-linear
model (NLM) for EH process in this paper, which was first
put forward in [24] and [25].






1+ exp (−µ (Pnerin − λ))] exp (µλ) − ψexp (µλ) ,
(11)
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∣∣hHmwi∣∣2 + ∣∣hHmz0∣∣2 + N∑
j=1





∣∣hHe wi∣∣2 + ∣∣hHe z0∣∣2 + N∑
j=1




(∣∣∣hHjnvj∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣hHjnuj∣∣∣2)+ M∑
i=1




(∣∣∣gHjnvj∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣gHjnuj∣∣∣2)+ N∑
i=1
(∣∣gH0nwi∣∣2)+ ∣∣gH0nz0∣∣2 + σner 2 . (10)
where ψ represents the maximum output power of RF-to-DC
circuit, µ and λ are both constant parameters depending on
the hardware components (e.g., resistance and capacitance),
which have influence on the sensitivity of RF-to-DC circuit.
Fig. 3 provides an example of the NLM with ψ = 62mW,
µ = 80, λ = 0.062 and compares that to the LM with
η = 0.7 to illustrate the promotion of rationality in two differ-
ent aspects. For one thing, the CE varies consecutively near
the sensitivity threshold (30mW) rather than presenting a step
response from 0 to 0.7, which accords better with the practice;
for another, as the input power rises up, the output power
gradually tends to saturate rather than growing infinitely with
the increment of input power, which coincideswith the simple
configuration in hardwares of IoT devices.
In account of the sensitivity threshold of RF-to-DC circuit,
the AWGN power is ignorant for EH process, hence the input











Based on above analysis, we aim to secure the transmis-
sions to legitimated decoding users (i.e., MUs and IRs) in
the presence of malicious terminals (i.e., Eve) and curious
users (i.e., ERs) by carefully designing the AN-aided MCBF.
We pay attention to the secrecy energy efficiency (SEE) to
achieve green communications. Further, we aim to improve
the average secrecy performance by guaranteeing that all the
cells can achieve a certain SEE level so that they could be
equal to each other, this is what ‘‘fairness’’ implies. To this





Pℵ/$ + Pε (13a)
s.t. QnER (v,u,w, z0) ≥ θ, ∀n ∈ [1,N ], (13b)
1
$
P0 (w, z0)+ Pε ≤ 1, (13c)
1
$
Pn (v,u)+ Pε ≤ 0, ∀n ∈ [1,N ], (13d)
where w = [w1, . . . ,wM ] ∈ CKm×M denotes the matrix that
stores the beamforming vectors at MBS, v = [v1, . . . , vN ] ∈
CKf×N and u = [u1, . . . ,uN ] ∈ CKf×N denote the matri-
ces that store the beamforming and AN vectors at FBSs,
respectively; Cns = log2 (1+ SINRnir )− log2 (1+ SINRner )










the sum of secrecy capacity at MUs; P0 and Pn denote the
power consumption of MBS and FBSn, respectively; $ ∈
(0, 1] is the power amplifier efficiency defined as the ratio
between the total RF output power and the DC input power,
and Pε represents the power loss in hardwares; θ denotes the
required power at each ER; 1 is the maximum output power
of MBS, while 0 represents that of each FBS.
Obviously, problem (13) is a max-min fractional program
which is nonconvex and thus cannot be solved directly and
efficiently. Therefore, we will first introduce some slack vari-
ables and solve it with semi-definite program (SDP) method
in the next section.
III. OPTIMIZATION IN THE SEE MAXIMIZATION DESIGN
We start by introducing an equivalent reformulation which
exposes the hidden convexity of the proposed max-min








+Pε ≤ rℵ, ∀ℵ ∈ [0,N ], (14b)
Cℵs (v,u,w, z0) ≥ rℵζ, ∀ℵ ∈ [0,N ], (14c)
constraints (13b)∼(13d), (14d)
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where ζ and r 1= [r0, r1, . . . , rN ] are newly introduced
slack variables. It is easy to check that the equalities in
(14b) and (14c) hold at the optimal solution. Otherwise,
the equalities are acquirable through decreasing ζ , and this
operation will not change the optimal objective value.
On this basis, to deal with the non-convexity of (14c),
we introduce several new auxiliary variables, i.e., l 1=
[l0, l1, . . . , lN ], τ a
1= [τ a1 , . . . , τ aN ], τ b 1= [τ b1 , . . . , τ bN ],
τ a0
1= [τ a01, . . . , τ a0M ], τ b0 1= [τ b01, . . . , τ b0M ], and reformulate
the problem mentioned above as
max
v,u,w,z0,r,ζ





























1+ SINRnir ≥ τ an , ∀n ∈ [1,N ], (15f)
1+ SINRner ≤ 1
τ bn
, ∀n ∈ [1,N ], (15g)




, ∀m ∈ [1,M ], (15i)
constraint (14d), (15j)
τ an ≥ 1, τ a0m ≥ 1, 1 ≥ τ bn ≥ 0, 1 ≥ τ b0m ≥ 0,
∀m ∈ [1,M ], ∀n ∈ [1,N ] .
In the same spirit, we transform (15f)∼(15i) into convex
ones with the aid of extra auxiliary variables, i.e., κ1 1=[




, κ2 1= [κ21 , . . . , κ2N ], κ10 1= [κ101, . . . , κ10M ]
and κ20
1= [κ201, . . . , κ20M ]. By applying SDR technique and











s.t. Tr (HnnVn) ≥
(



































+Tr (GjnUj) ]+σ 2ner ≤ κ2n , (16e)
Tr (HmWm) ≥
(



































Tr (HeWi)+σ 2e ≤ κ20m, (16i)
M∑
i=1
Tr (Wi)+Tr (Z0) ≤ 1$ − Pε, (16j)










+Tr (G0nZ0) ≥ 3(θ), (16l)
constraints (15b) ∼ (15e), (16m)
Vn  0, Un  0, Wm  0, Z0  0,
κ1n ≥ 0, kappa10m ≥ 0, κ2n ≥ 0, κ20m ≥ 0,
∀n ∈ [1,N ], ∀m ∈ [1,M ],
where









represents the inverse function of RF-to-DC conversion
in NLM; Hp = hphHp (p∈ [m, e, 0n, nn, jn, jom, joe]),
Gq = gqgHq (q ∈ [0n, nn, jn]), Wm = wmwHm (m ∈ [1,M ]),
Z0 = z0zH0 , Vn = vnvHn and Un = unuHn (n ∈ [1,N ]).
However, problem (16) is still nonconvex owning to the
form of f (x, y) = xy in (16b), (16d), (16f), (16h) and
(15c), (15e) in (16m). Fortunately, we notice that the cou-
pling of variables all occur in the right hand side of a con-
straint with ≥, which indicates that we can replace them
with their upper bounds in convex forms without relaxation.
In this regard, we apply conservatively convex-constrained
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conditions based on SCA algorithm, the detailed introduction
of which can be obtained in [26]. For any ξ , we define the
following function




which serves as the upper bound of f (x, y) according to
the arithmetic-geometric mean inequality, and the equality
holds if and only if ξ = xy . Obviously, if f (x, y) is replaced
by gξ (x, y), each of above nonconvex constraints can be
conservatively approximated into several convex quadratic
constraints, and the problem can be transformed into solving
a series of convex problems iteratively. Therefore, in the
q-th iterative approximation, (15c), (15e), (16b), (16d), (16f)
and (16h) can be transformed into (19)∼(24), respectively,













≥ g(q)ξo2 (r0, ζ ), (20)
Tr (HnnVn) ≥ g(q)ξa
(
















Tr (G0nWi)+ σ 2ner
≥ g(q)ξb
(























≥ g(q)ξd (τ b0m, κ20m), (24)
where g(q)ξ◦ (x, y)
(























d are the (q−1)-






























ζ |(15b), (15d), (16c), (16e), (16g),
(16i) ∼ (16l), (19)∼(24)
}
. (26)
Nevertheless, the convex constrains in logarithmic forms,
i.e., (15b), (15d), (19) and (20), bring about high compu-
tational complexity, which may deteriorate the solving effi-
ciency severely. To facilitate tractability, we convert them
into second order cone (SOC) representable constraints while





) ≥ τ an ln,∀n ∈ [1,N ], (27)
and the left hand side can be proved to be convex by its second





≥ τ an (q−1)log2
(
τ an






(q−1))]−τ an (q−1), (28)
where τ an
(q−1) is the (q−1)-th approximation of τ an . Hence we






(q−1))]− τ an (q−1) ≥ τ an ln, (29)
which can be written as an SOC representable form as









Likewise, (19) can be transformed into
















Afterwards, to deal with (15d) and (20), which are slightly
different, we need to introduce several new slack variables
l0α = {lm0α}m∈[1,M ], l0β = {lm0β}m∈[1,M ] and rewrite them as
M∑
m=1
lm0α ≥ l0, (32)
M∑
m=1
lm0β ≥ g(q)ξo2 (r0, ζ )− l0, (33)
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TABLE 1. Computational complexity analysis.
Finally, the problem can be expressed as
max
V,U,W,Z0,r,l,ζ,







ζ |(16c), (16e), (16g), (16i) ∼ (16l),
(21)∼(24), (30) ∼ (35)
}
, (36)
which can be solved efficiently via state-of-the-art conic
solvers, such as CVX [27].
Notice that the rank-one constraints have been relaxed
in problem (16), but generally, the optimal solution to the
rank-relaxed problem may be not rank-one, hence the result
of the rank-relaxed problem serves as a performance upper
bound for the original problem. Only when the rank of the
optimal solution to problem (36) is one, problem (36) and
problem (13) have the same optimal result and solution.
Fortunately, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: If problem (36) is feasible and
{
Wˆ1, . . . ,
WˆM , Zˆ0 , Vˆ1, . . . , VˆN , Uˆ1, . . . UˆN
}
are the optimal solu-
tions, they must be of rank-one.
Proof: Please see Appendix.
Complexity Analysis: According to [28], we know the
complexity of solving an optimization problem through




is composed of two parts, namely, iteration complexity
O(√θ∗ ln ( 1
ε
) )
and per-iteration computational cost O(L).
To be specific, θ∗ is the barrier parameter determined by
the number, the size of positive semi-definite definite (PSD)






is associated with the required precision of solutions;
O(L) mainly stems from the number of optimization vari-
ables, the number of PSD constraints and their sizes, the SOC
constraints and their sizes.
In our proposed iterative algorithm, the design problem has
(M + 1)K 2m + 2NK 2f design variables and 6N + 6M + 3
slack variables, M + 1 PSD constraints of size Km, 2N PSD
constraints of size Kf and 4M + 6N + 3 PSD constraints of






that is determined by the solution precision, we can
obtain the computational complexity order of the iterative
algorithm in Table 1.
IV. DECENTRALIZED DESIGN WITH ADMM
In the previous section, we obtain the optimal solution to
the cross-tier MCBF design by applying SDR technique.
However, the proposed method is executed in a centralized
manner, which indicates the requirement of gathering all the
CSI of coordinated BSs at a calculating center when joint
designing the transmit beams and AN vectors, hence the
centralized approach would doubtless incur heavy overhead
to the network especially when the number of coordinated
BSs is large. Furthermore, the scenario without an available
central processing station should also be taken into account
carefully.5 Therefore, to find a decentralized solving method
where each transmitter only needs to deal with its local CSI
is of significant necessity.
FIGURE 4. Key steps of the ADMM approach.
ADMM is a decentralized approach based on the com-
bination of dual decomposition method and augmented
Lagrangian method. In ADMM, there are mainly three key
steps, as illustrated in Fig. 4. The first ingredient is to con-
struct the penalty augmented problem while setting a penalty
parameter to guarantee the convergence; then, the decompo-
sition is conducted with dual variables introduced so that the
problem can be solved in parallel at different BSs; finally,
5We provide two practical cases where no central processing station is
available: a) there is a low trust degree among the BSs, hence they are not
willing to send their local CSI to any other BS; b) the processing capacity
of each BS is at a comparable level, while handing the CSI of all the BSs is
unbearable for any one of them.
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three kinds of variables are updated in an iterative manner
until the solution converges to an expected precision.
To begin with, we first define some slack variables as





X IRa,b= X˜ IRb,a=χabIR, ∀a ∈ [0,N ], ∀b ∈ [1,N ], a 6= b,
(37c)
XERa,b = X˜ERb,a=χabER, ∀a ∈ [0,N ], ∀b ∈ [1,N ], a 6= b,
(37d)
Xmc,0 = X˜m0,c = χcom, ∀c ∈ [1,N ], (37e)
X ec,0 = X˜ e0,c = χcoe, ∀c ∈ [1,N ], (37f)
where all the variables in (37c)∼(37f) denote the inter-cell
interference (ICI) brought by a BS to a user accessing another
BS. Xna,b / X˜
n
b,a (n ∈ {IR,ER}) or Xoc,0 / X˜o0,c (o ∈ {m, e})
forms a pair of variables that express the same ICI, while
the element without a hat (i.e., X ) in the pair denotes the
local variable stored at the interfering BS and the one with
a hat (i.e., X˜ ) denotes that stored at the interfered BS, respec-
tively. Specifically, X IRa,b and X
ER
a,b are the local variables of
FBSa (a ≥ 1) or MBS (a = 0), while X˜ IRb,a and X˜ERb,a are
those of FBSb. Moreover, Xmc,0 and X
e
c,0 can only be stored at
FBSc (c ≥ 1) while X˜m0,c and X˜ e0,c are at the MBS. Notice that
the slack variables χabIR, χabER, χcom and χcoe can be deemed
as the global copies of former ones, which are introduced to
ensure the copies of the same ICI stored at different BSs are
indeed equal to each other. Further, to facilitate tractability,
we weaken the differences of heterogeneous BSs by denoting
the MBS as BS0 and FBSn as BSn, and rewrite problem (36)
in a decomposable form as6
min
v,u,w,z0,r,l,l0α,l0β ,ζ












s.t. X IRn¯,i≥Tr(Hn¯iPn¯), ∀n¯∈ [0,N ], ∀i∈ [1,N ],
i 6= n¯, (38b)
XERn¯,i ≤Tr(Gn¯iPn¯), ∀n¯∈ [0,N ], ∀i∈ [1,N ],
i 6= n¯ (38c)
Xmn,0≥Tr(HnomPn), ∀n∈ [1,N ], ∀m∈ [1,M ],
(38d)




X˜ IRn,i + σ 2nir≤κ1n , (38f)
6Though we include the MBS and the FBSs in the same set, some
associated variables are still in different forms. In this regard, we use two
different subscripts (i.e., n and n¯) to maintain the difference. When using
n¯(0 ≤ n¯ ≤ N ) we refer to the set including all the BSs, and when n(1 ≤ n ≤










































X˜ e0,j+σ 2e ≤κ20m,
(38k)
ζn¯ = ζ, ∀n¯∈ [0,N ], (38l)
constraints(16j), (16k), (21), (23),
(30)∼ (35), (37). (38m)
Next we include all the constraints that can be handled
locally at BSn¯ in the set S
q
n¯ which is defined as
Sqn¯
1={sn¯|(16j), (16k), (21), (23), (30)∼ (35), (38b)∼ (38k)},
(39)
where sn
1= [ζn, vn,un, rn, ln, κ1n , κ2n , τ an , τ bn ,ATn ], n ∈
[1,N ], simply stacks all the local variables that can
be locally handled at BSn, and specially for s0
1=[











In what follows, we define
An
1= [X1n,0,X2n,0, . . . ,XMn,0,X en,0,X IRn,1,XERn,1 , . . . ,XERn,n−1,
X IRn,n+1, . . . ,X IRn,N ,XERn,N , X˜ IRn,0, X˜ERn,0 , . . . , X˜ERn,n−1,
X˜ IRn,n+1, . . . , X˜ IRn,N , X˜ERn,N
]T
, n ∈ [1,N ], (40)
which only includes the ICIs relevant to BSn, and in particular
A0
1= [X IR0,1,XER0,1 , . . . ,X IR0,N ,XER0,N , X˜10,1, . . . , X˜M0,1, X˜ e0,1, . . . ,









1= [χn01, χn02, . . . , χn0M , χn0e, χn1IR, χn1ER, . . . ,
χn(n−1)ER, χn(n+1)IR, . . . , χnN IR, χnNER, χ0nIR,
χ0nER, . . . , χ(n−1)nIR, χ(n−1)nER, . . . , χNnIR, χNnER
]T
,
n ∈ [1,N ] (42)
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and
B0
1= [χ01IR, χ01ER, . . . , χ0N IR, χ0NER, χ1o1, χ1o2, . . . ,
χ1oM, χ1oe, χ2o1, . . . , χNo1, . . . , χNoe
]T (43)
by sorting the corresponding global versions of ICI in An˜.
From the definitions above, (38) can be equivalently rewrit-







s.t. sn¯ ∈ Sqn¯, ∀n¯ ∈ [0,N ], (44b)
An¯ = Bn¯, ∀n¯ ∈ [0,N ], (44c)
ζn¯ = ζ, ∀n¯ ∈ [0,N ], (44d)









Now, we are in a position to describe the ADMM to
solve (36) in a decentralized manner. First, we construct the












s.t. constraints (44b), (45b)
where c > 0 is the penalty parameter. Note that the optimal
result and solution are not changed, and the added terms
c
2 (ζn − ζ )2 and c2 ‖An − Bn‖22 are required to ensure the con-
vergence of ADMM algorithm.
Afterwards, we carry out the dual decomposition, which
enables each BS to deal with its local CSI in a coordinated










‖An¯ − Bn¯‖22 +2n¯ (ζn¯ − ζ )
+ϒn¯ ‖An¯ − Bn¯‖22
]
, (46)
where2n¯ andϒn¯ are the associated Lagrangemultipliers, and
we define2 1= [20,21, . . . ,2N ], ϒ 1= [ϒ0, ϒ1, . . . , ϒN ].
We now come to the central part of ADMM, which is
to update the global variables (i.e., ), the local variables
(i.e., S), and the Lagrange multipliers (i.e., 2 and ϒ) by
using the Gauss-Seidel method. Succinctly speaking, at each
iteration, all BSs agree a common knowledge of associated
interference variables and the consensus SEE by updating
global variables. Then, each BS independently solves its own
sub-problem and updates its Lagrange multipliers to drive the
corresponding variables into equality. The detailed updating
procedures are shown as follows.
A. UPDATE OF GLOBAL VARIABLES
It is the update of global variables that starts the iteration.
When updating the global variables, the local variables are
fixed, and the updated values can be acquired by solving
the convex problem min

Lq (,St ,2t ,ϒ t), where t denotes
the ADMM iteration counter. Meanwhile, we notice that
Lq (,St ,2t ,ϒ t) is separable in ζ and {Bn}, and thus the
minimization of  can be further decomposed into several
independent subproblems, which can be expressed as














−(ϒ tn¯)T Bn¯+ c2 ∥∥Atn¯−Bn¯∥∥22 ,∀n¯ ∈ [0,N ],
(48)
where ζ tn¯ and A
t
n¯ are obtained by solving (53) in the t-th
iteration and exchanging corresponding variables among the
coordinated BSs. According to [29], the closed-form solu-
tions to (47) and (48) can be expressed as

























n ∈ [1,N ], ∗ ∈
{
[1,M ], i = 0
































i ∈ [0,N ], ∗ ∈
{
[1,M ], n¯ = 0










are the dual variables
associated with the primal variables
{





of BSi(i 6= n), receptively. In other words, each
BS can run an average consensus algorithm [30], [31] to










from other BSs to finally obtain χ t+1n¯i∗ and χ
t+1
in¯∗ .
B. UPDATE OF LOCAL VARIABLES
Afterwards, the following convex problem is solved to update
the set of local variables S







Considering the key feature of the ADMM, which makes
it a distributed approach, the augmented Lagrangian function
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is decomposable in sn¯, hence problem (52) can be solved in
parallel at each coordinated BS. That is, BSn¯ only needs to
handle its local CSI to solve the following subproblem




ζn¯ − ζ t+1
)







where ζ t+1 and Bt+1n¯ are acquired by updating global vari-
ables in the previous step. Since all the constraints in (39) are
convex so that each subproblem can be solved with the aid of
existing convex solvers.
C. UPDATE OF LAGRANGE MULTIPLIERS
Finally, the Lagrange multipliers are updated as
2t+1n¯ = 2tn¯ + c
(
ζ t+1n¯ − ζ t+1
)
, ∀n¯ ∈ [0,N ], (54)
and




, ∀n¯ ∈ [0,N ] . (55)
We recall that after the previous two steps, the local and
global variables are all available to the BSs in this step, hence
there is no more information exchange required for updating
the Lagrangemultipliers, which in turn incurs no extra signal-
ing overhead [29]. Furthermore, we define the primal residual
as 4 =
√∑N
n¯=0 ‖ [ζ tn¯, (Atn¯)T ]T − [ζ t , (Btn¯)T ]T ‖22, which is
utilized for the ADMM-loop break control. When the primal
residual is inferior to the preset precision, e.g., 4 ≤ 10−4,
the ADMM algorithm is deemed to converge. Then, the SCA
parameters can be updated and it comes to the (q+1)-th SCA
iteration. In general, the ADMM-based beam design can be
summarized as Algorithm 1 (i.e., a dual-loop optimization
algorithm), where the outer loop is the SCA-based iterative
procedure while the inner one is the ADMM-based iteration.
1) INFORMATION EXCHANGE
As shown in Algorithm 1, the information exchange mainly
occurs in the steps 4 and 5. To be more specific, in step 4,
each BS needs to exchange ξqn and2
q
n with other N BSs; and
in step 5, the MBS needs to send out 2N variables including
X˜∗i,n
q and X∗i,n
q to the FBSs; while each FBS BSn (n ≥ 1) is
bound to send out 2 variables to each of the other (N − 1)
FBSs and M variables to the MBS. In the current LTE sys-
tems, the information exchange process among BSs can be
accomplished via the X2 interface. We also note that the
exchanged variables are all real-valued numbers that mea-
sure corresponding interference power, which brings about
an obvious reduction in signaling overhead compared to the
complex CSI exchanges [29].
2) PER BS COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
We notice that the complexity of algorithm 1 is mainly
determined by step 6, during which each BS solves the
Algorithm 1 ADMM-Based Dual-Loop Optimization
Algorithm for SEE Maximization in MCBF Design
Initialization: Set q := 0, t := 0 and choose initial feasible
values for (vq,uq,wq, zq, rq, lq, κ1,q, κ2,q, τ a,q, τ b,q, lq0α,









Output: optimal value of (v∗,u∗,w∗, z∗)
1: repeat {outer loop-SCA}
2: while 4 ≤ 10−4 do {inner loop-ADMM}
3: for n¯ ∈ [0,N ] do
4: BSn¯ updates ζ t+1 through an average consensus
algorithm [30].




in¯∗ by (50) and (51).
6: BSn¯ updates st+1n¯ by (53)





by (54) and (55), respectively.
8: end for
9: t := t + 1
10: end while
11: Obtain optimal value of (vˆ, uˆ, wˆ, zˆ) in outer q-th loop
12: Update SCA parameters (vq+1,uq+1,wq+1, zq+1, rq+1,
lq+1, κ1,q+1, κ2,q+1, τ a,q+1, τ b,q+1, lq+10α , l
q+1
0β ) =






















13: q := q+ 1, t := 0.
14: until SCA coverages.
15: return (v∗,u∗,w∗, z∗)
problem (53). Thus, the computational cost can be obtained
in the similar way as in the previous section. To be more
specific, the subproblem at the MBS has (M+1)K 2m variables
and 6M+3 slack variables,M+1 PSD constraints of sizeKm,
4M + 3 PSD constraints of size 1, as well as 2M SOC con-
straints of size 2; at each FBS, the problem has 2K 2f variables
and 9 slack variables, 2 PSD constraints of size Km, 6 PSD
constraints of size 1, as well as 2 SOC constraints of size 2.
Then, the computational complexity orders at different BSs
are presented in Table 1, and obviously the processing stress
is averaged on multiple BSs instead of being concentrated on
the calculating center.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results and discussions.
We consider the simulation scenario where two MUs and an
Eve are randomly distributed in a macrocell with a radius
of 500m, while a couple of IoT users are scattered randomly
in each femtocell with a radius of 150m. With the MBS
located at the origin of coordinate system, the coordinates
of FBSs are randomly generated within the coverage of
macrocell, as shown in Fig. 5. In the simulations, the small-
scale fading coefficients all follow Gaussian distributed.
The path loss and shadowing are modeled as β(dB) =
38log10 (d)+ 34.5+CN (0, 8), where d denotes the distance
from transmitter to receiver in the corresponding channel.
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FIGURE 5. Illustration of simulation scenario.
TABLE 2. Simulation parameters.
Other general simulation parameters are listed in Table 2 and
specific ones are given in the corresponding figures. All sim-
ulation results are averaged over 1000 randomly generated
channel realizations.
FIGURE 6. Secrecy performance versus the number of antennas
configured at FBS.
Fig. 6 presents the secrecy performance versus the num-
ber of available antennas at each FBS. The SEE curves,
the achievable secrecy rate of BSs, as well as the average
power consumption at the MBS and FBSs are illustrated
in sub-figures (a)∼(d), respectively. As shown in Fig. 6(a),
the proposedmethod of AN-aidedMCBF design outperforms
the one without AN (hereinafter referred to as non-AN) and
the one without joint design among neighbor BSs (hereinafter
referred to as non-MCBF). We notice that as Km increases,
the SEE levels obtained via three methods are all promoted,
whereas the performance gaps between AN-aided MCBF
design and non-AN, non-MCBF methods tend to shrink,
which can be contributed to the spatial degree of freedom
brought by multi-antennas technique. When more antennas
are available at each FBS, the resolution ratio of achievable
space is concurrently promoted, and the diversity between
legitimated channels (i.e., from FBSs to IRs) and wiretap-
ping channels (i.e., from FBSs to ERs) can be guaranteed
more easily with less AN injected. As a consequence, higher
secrecy rate can be achieved with less power (of both beam
and AN) consumed, as shown in Fig. 6(b) and Fig. 6(d), and
the effect of AN tends to decrease.
FIGURE 7. Secrecy performance versus the number of antennas
configured at MBS.
Fig. 7 shows the impact of the number of available antennas
at MBS on secrecy performance. With more antennas con-
figured, the MBS could save power while providing com-
parative secrecy capacity, and the SEE in macrocell will be
surely promoted. In order to improve the average SEE level,
the MBS utilizes a portion of power saved by configuring
more antennas to confuse as well as transfer energy to the
ERs in femtocells. Therefore, each FBS can allocate more
power for beam part and improve the secrecy rate as shown
in Fig. 7(b) and Fig. 7(d), thus the average SEE is further
promoted. However, by comparing Fig. 7(a) to Fig. 6(a),
we discover that the enhancement brought by increasingKm is
not as obvious as increasingKf . The reason lies that the power
saved at theMBS needs to be distributed to three ERs, and the
secrecy gain obtained at each femtocell is rather limited.
Fig. 8 depicts the secrecy performance versus the harvest-
ing requirements of ERs. If more energy is required at each
ER, more power needs to be allocated to AN and thus the SEE
tends to decrease in femtocells. As mentioned in section II,
the non-linear harvesting model is adopted, where the
required RF power is bound to present exponential growth
as the harvesting requirement increases linearly, hence the
varying rates of secrecy rate and transmit power both rise
up with the increment of harvesting requirement, as depicted
in Fig. 8(b) and Fig. 8(d). Then we focus on the varying
trend of power consumption and secrecy rate in the macro-
cell. Though SWIPT is not performed at the MBS and the
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FIGURE 8. Secrecy performance versus the EH requirement.
increasing of harvesting requirement should not make any
change, the SEE in the macrocell tends to decrease owning
to the fairness requirement. In other words, when the average
SEE in femtocells decreases, the average performance is
further deteriorated, and there is no need for the macrocell
to stay at a high SEE level. On the contrary, the MBS shares
part of the task of power transfer, as illustrated in Fig. 8(c),
which helps retard the decreasing of globe SEE.
FIGURE 9. Secrecy performance versus the maximum transmit power
at FBS.
Next, we pay attention to the effect of maximum output
power at BSs on the SEE performance. Considering the power
supply is usually sufficient at the MBS, we mainly focus on
the FBSs in this part, as presented in Fig. 9. The validity of
AN-aidedMCBF design is firstly verified in Fig. 9(a), and the
varying trend can be analyzed as follows. Owning to the fast
fading of power along with distance, the transmit power for
satisfying the harvesting requirement of ER is relatively high.
If the maximum output power is poorly guaranteed at the
FBS, the SEE will be limited to a low level. As the maximum
transmit power grows, more available power can be allocated
for improving secrecy rate, which can surely bring about
substantial performance gain. In addition, we also notice that
the curve of SEE tends to level off when the transmit power
is relatively sufficient. This is because increasing transmit
power linearly results in a logarithmic growth in secrecy rate,
and when the secrecy rate gain can not catch up with the
increment of transmit power, the SEE will not be promoted
by increasing transmit power anymore, which we call the
‘‘power saturation.’’
FIGURE 10. Optimization results versus the iteration index.
Fig. 10 illustrates the convergence performance of the two
algorithms proposed in this paper in terms of SEE versus
the iteration index. As can be observed, with the centralized
SCA-based algorithm, the SEE converges to a stabilized value
after 8 iterations. With the expected precision set to 10−4,
the stable SEE can be achieved within 12 iterations under dif-
ferent channel realizations (i.e., ch1 and ch2). As for ADMM,
we should point out that the converging rate is much slower
than the centralized algorithm, which is unsurprising and can
be contributed to the distributed solving manner. Moreover,
awaiting ADMM-based inner loop to converge in each SCA
iteration (outer loop) also slows down the converging rate
severely. But actually in first several outer loops, the results
obtained by ADMM procedure are still rough estimations of
the optimal solutions, hence there is no need to arrive at the
results that completely converge, instead, the ADMM-loop
can be forced to break by the inner loop counter (e.g., t ≥ 5),
which works well in improving the converging rate.
FIGURE 11. Optimization results on random channel realizations.
Fig. 11 provides the performance comparison between
the SCA-based centralized approach and the ADMM-based
decentralized algorithm in terms of the SEE over 20 ran-
dom channel realizations. As illustrated, under most of the
channel realizations, the ADMM-based algorithm can almost
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converge to the optimal solution obtained by the SCA-based
centralized design, which further implies the validity of dis-
tributed ADMM-based algorithm.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated the PLS in HetNets, where the fem-
tocells performed SWIPT to power energy-constrained IoT
users. To guard both the MUs and the IoT users, we con-
sidered an AN-aided cross-tier MCBF design. To secure
the transmissions while achieving green communications,
the SEE was deemed as the optimization target. On this basis,
we formulated the problem of maximizing the minimum
SEE to promote the average performance of the entire net-
work. To handle the formulated nonconvex problem, we first
applied SDR technique by maintaining the tightness and then
introduced an SCA-based algorithm for complexity reduc-
tion. To further release the processing stress on the calculating
center and the signaling overhead of the network, we pro-
posed an ADMM-based decentralized algorithm that allows
each BS to deal with its local CSI. Simulation results verified
the performance of AN-aided MCBF design and the validity
of decentralized algorithm.
APPENDIX
The Lagrange function of problem (16) can be written as











































































Tr (Vn)+ Tr (Un)
] 1
$













where A ∈ HNf+ , B ∈ HNf+ , C ∈ HNm+ , D ∈ HNm+ ,
λ1 ∈ R+, λ2 ∈ R+, λ3 ∈ R+ are the Lagrange multipliers
associated with problem (16). We accomplish the proof by
taking an example of Vγ (γ ∈ [1,N ]), hence we derive the































































)2 ] = 0, (57)
VnAn = 0, An  0, ∀n ∈ [1,N ] . (58)
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which completes the proof that Vn is of rank-one. Likewise,
the ranks of Un,Wm, Z0 can all be proved to be one, and we
omit the detailed process for the sake of briefness.
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